... But even in the last half of the year, when Ter-Petrossyan's movement was taking shape, the information dissemination via modern infrastructures—the working media—was almost absent. The official media are lying, and are lying in many senses: sometimes they do not lie (when delivering the official news). Sometimes they just talk round. Sometimes they are unprofessional. And sometimes they lie outwardly and present the white as the black, and vice versa. Combined, this situation has an effect on the international media. The western outlets are not much interested in the news from Armenia. Only after yesterday's killings the news about Armenia came on the second (immediately after the killings started) or 4th-6th positions on the websites of BBC and CNN. The Russian media are more thorough and detailed, but the news from Armenia there never were even on the 6th place, only somewhere on the 10th or lower. This lack of mass informing infrastructure—primarily inside the country—creates the important effect: one has to see with one's own eyes, and hear with one's own ears, to be able to reconstruct, at least plausibly, what is going on.

One conclusion from this is that the real cause of what has happened is lack of freedom of speech, which is an example of the lack of other freedoms, which, even if the social issues are not counted in, means lack of opportunities for general public to participate seriously, rather than ritualistically, in the political processes and thus, becomes one of the major reasons for yesterday's clashes.

The other conclusion is that either side—the incumbent power and the opposition—if they want to win, have to go for freedom of information. But if the incumbent power really goes for it, it will just lose. Now it's too late. The point of no return is past. However, it does not seem to be on the agenda of the opposition either—partly because they just don't understand why is it needed, partly because they don't have the mental capacity to understand, partly because they don't have the infrastructural capacity (though given the levels of wealth circulating today in Armenia, this should not have been very difficult to create), and partly because they, being formerly in power, in fact did everything to curtail the freedom of speech and thus they were the authors of the situation in hand, meaning that many among them sincerely think that the public should be informed in pieces and information should be manipulated for political purposes.

The last conclusion from the above is that if ever any serious opposition is going to be formed in Armenia, it should have serious infrastructure and culture of the freedom of speech.

Thus I start from my personal impressions, because no reading or listening to any mass media outlet is capable of explaining plausibly the situation. My impression is that the movement which has been partly crystallized around Ter-Petrossyan, is honest and sincere genuine grassroots movement for opposition. While not in an articulate manner, it is for genuine democracy in Armenia. The public who take part in it, honestly and deeply believe that they, that us, the Armenians, can and should and will create a functioning democracy. Despite the context, despite the postponed war, and despite lack of political culture of democracy. The majority of them, not knowing how in fact to go for it, chose their representative, the tank which can break down the current impasse and help them to go for the realization of their aims, the figure of the first president of Armenia. They know that this is a deeply imperfect figure, but they felt that he might have power enough, as different from all the other opposition sugarheads, to turn the situation upside down.

This was what ter-Petrossyan was skilled in understanding and organizing: this genuine feeling of discontent and desire for change. On the point of accusing the incumbent power in being 'occupational power' he stroke a chord in the souls of the masses. On the point of making some, unclear and unknown, compromises on the Nk issue, however, his supporters were much deeper divided: but they left it for a later time.

Ter-Petrossyan's movement has strong points and weaknesses. It is strong, or has been strong until yesterday, in convincing its supporters that they are people who are together. And in the lack of mass media infrastructure, the only way to keep that conviction has been to be physically together. In the point of having medium-level leadership, organizational structure etc., however, this movement is quite weak: there are no leaders, or almost no leaders, who can, in the absence of Ter-Petrossyan, organize these masses to a similar extent. After 10 years of silence, Ter-Petrossyan did not have enough time to develop the leadership infrastructure around him. He could not have done that also for a few other reasons: he never liked medium-level leaders, and tolerated only those who he could not get rid of. Armenia today lacks this kind of leadership, i.e. the rule of Kocharyan has been counter-productive for development of this kind of people, rather trying to concentrate on cloning a-political civil servants, who are good if the general structure is fair, and fail when political and moral and ethical choices have to be made, since they learn that Codes of Conduct are only a façade, they are for external use rather than determining sets of principles for political or close-to political actions, like ministerial day-to-day work. Thus Ter-Petrossyan could not recruit these types of leaders from the existing pools in sufficient numbers.

Thus we are talking mainly about quite a disoriented crowd, a personalized leadership of it, and a state which by its intellectual and professional capacities is incapable of governing in modern ways, however much, theoretically, it would like to do so.

The reason for lack of freedom of speech could be: a) the incumbent power has been scared to provide for it, having a reasonable expectation that given it, they may be out of power or may have to change to an extent that they are not ready for. B) they are just following the wrong examples, like Russia, and it is just a passive presence in a historical moment on the spiral of history which can be called the backlash after the first big bang—the appearance of the independent states. C) they can't even understand, culturally and genetically (having the genes of a homo sovieticus), how important is it—not only for the political development, but much deeper—for the very existence and development the nation, which they like to claim that are fond of so devotedly. They can't even understand that if in politics this system allows them to survive thus far, in culture it is resulting in the dissipation of the nation in huge numbers, via adopting other cultures superficially to make it up for the lack of their own national content, because the modern human being, the modern citizen, suffers from sensory hunger.

Moreover, the situation is even more complex, because lack of freedom of speech is compounded by the usual empty eloquency of the Armenian speakers and of the Armenian language, and even more: given the, again probably genetical, liberalism of an average Armenian, and the general weakness of the Armenian statehood, lack of freedom of speech is 'less' organized and omnipresent, in certain senses, than, say, in Russia or, moreover, in North Korea.

Given this background, no wonder that the people in the Opera square did not know what to expect; Ter-Petrossyan did not know what will happen next; the riot police did not know what to do; the world and the general public did not know what is going on; and nobody knows how will this all end.

I am not even talking about the Parliament, which by its very literal sense in English and French is about talking: having brought down the level of parliament via negative selection for several years, both current and former leadership cannot really expect it to be of any help. The irrelevance of the parliament was well illustrated by the late night session devoted to discussing and "approving" the Emergency rule. And the speech of Tigran Torosyan was a perfect example of substituting public discussion by a mixture of Armenian fairy tales, accusations, self-flagellating, manipulating the vote and the role of PMs and a scare to clearly say who is who and what is at stake.

Speech means articulation, articulation means meaning, meaning means learning what does this or that mean, learning that means getting smarter, more organized, capable of acting better. When speech is prohibited and the society is raised on measured ritualistic dozes of speaking, the society does not really know how to function.

The supporters of Ter-Petrossyan may tell me many different things, like for instance that he knows what to expect. He has that aura around him: he says something and some people blindfoldedly believe him. They may say that he has counted it all in advance. They may say that in the situation which I described, he is the only one who can deliver drastic change. That one has to do the things the way one does, to mirror the incumbent power, to get things done. That he is alone and that that is the reality. I will respectfully listen to their opinions.

The supporters of Kocharyan and Sarkissyan cannot say anything to which I will listen respectfully. If the state of Armenia should be distinguished from their rule, then I can only make a call to everybody who feels for the statehood: Make that distinction!

In military tactics, secrecy is sometimes great. The other way around is called foolishness. In civic governance, however, freedom of speech and thought and transparency is the way forward, for development. If you are surrounded by enemies and don't trust nobody, secrecy and silence are a smart thing, if you want to survive. If you are the leader of your society and nation, it is detrimental. Neither the infrequent eloquent monologist Ter-Petrossyan during his time of rule, nor the broken-mouth current leadership have ever considered to make a choice between these simple alternatives: for them always, freedom of speech and speech itself have been soviet-like political manipulation tools rather than a value in itself, a self-starter for a serious and strong democracy.

The rest is simple: in the morning, around 6.30, the riot police came to the Opera square (called Freedom square by those who were there and Theatrical square by the current rulers). They had the b***ons and the electrical shock devices. Some say they blew up tear gaz near the tents. They cleaned the square of the people. They ruined the tents. They as if found a few things which might be considered as weapons. But they mainly did not pursue the people who left the Opera square. Why then, and why this way? Perhaps because it was convenient—Ter-Petrossyan just submitted his complaint to the Constitutional Court. It was Saturday, meaning the rest of the city was deeply in sleep. It was the day before Russian elections—a silence day in Russia. It was before the OSCE another unordinary report. Who knows? But they did it. Beforehand on TV one could see, during the meeting of Kocharyan with the Yerevan University teachers and infrequent studends who agreed to come there, how worried was Kocharyan. They suit each other—the incumbent power and the tank who wants to get rid of it. Ter-Petrossyan developed some crazy movement, and Kocharyan et al became scared of it. And when they are scared, they do wrong things, like calling up a rally in support of Serj Sarkissyan—a rally which then went and joined the Opera Square strikers. Or another wrong thing—like cleansing the Opera Square from people. Wrong or well thought-through?

But if one studies the chain of events and looks for who benefits, so far Serj Sarkissyan is the loser (his image is really down), Levon Ter-Petrossyan is the second loser (his image is down too), and Robert Kocharyan is temporarily-tactically the winner (he is still in charge, and there is more likelihood for him to stay in charge, if the people stop pressurizing). It is too simplistic to assume that the entire process is masterminded by him, however, the fact that he personally wins over the situation for a while, at the same time ruining the perspectives of Armenia for fair development, perhaps for years, sounds true.

The riot police was not hard on the protesters—it just pushed them out of the square. The protesters tried to resist. It was then characterized as if the riot police was just trying to make a search for weapons, and the protesters attacked them first. Well, that is what I am talking about: about ritualistic sense of words. Nobody wants to make a sense. Imagine that you are in a tent for 10 days, every night scarily expecting to be arrested, beaten up, killed, and suddenly with no warning the riot police appear in front of you. They don't attack you: they just approach as if silently, 6.30 in the morning, and 'respectfully' ask you to let them search your tent's premises. What will you do? You will respectfully abandon your tent, and silently wait until the search is completed, right? Oh-ho. If you are smart enough you can ask for a search warrant. Anyway. The riot police pushed people out.

Then happened what is called social creativity: next to the French Embassy, a group of those ousted from the Opera square met with some police officers. The riot police asked them to disperse. They didn't. The riot police did not attack them. Why? It was before noon on March 1. Why they did not disperse these 30-40 men? Because, probably, they either did not have a command to do that, or were full of sympathy, or did not want to do that in front of the French square, or were scared of clash. Whatever the reason, the crowd started to gather there in increasing numbers. By 3 o'clock, there were hundreds of thousands of people there, much more, than there were in the last days in the Opera Square. And for a long while, there was no leadership around there, and when it appeared, it wasn't enough.

The idea to stage a rally in front of the French embassy was floating in the air beforehand: while this movement is good in that it does not really and seriously expect any more support from the 'West', people still tend to believe in the fairness of the West and that the West will not allow illegalities to happen. So perhaps this first group of men who ended up clashing there with the riot police did not appear there totally by accident. Another strange happenstance was that one of the litter gathering trucks, and particularly the one which had a load of tents and other personal belongings evacuated from the Opera square, happened to pass through that street and seemingly by accident was stopped by the people who decided to expropriate the truck for another barricade. Seeing that it's their belongings inside, they just emptied the truck on the pavement, and I took the picture of rally blankets mixed with garbage. Whatever the background, soon the riot police was still standing, whereas these men started to hijack busses and trolleys and putting them around in order to defend the gathering crowd from attacks. This happened particularly when an attack came from the side of the Wine factory and Vivacell. This was countered, and the riot police who were still standing there while a trolleybus was already put right behind them as a barricade, finally dispersed. About 12 police officers were beaten up. It was at that time when what looked like an old soviet-style jeep, called willis, came from the side of the Wine factory, crushed two citizens, was stopped, emptied from its driver and passenger (who apparently disappeared with no harm), and was put on fire. It was probably slightly later than noon. Soon afterwards, the riot police left, and the entire vicinity was free of any state supervision. Thus the territory from the Circus to the Fish Shop, and from Wine factory to Congress Hotel, was entirely in the hands of the people. This is a huge territory. While there were hundreds of thousands around the Myasnikyan monument, at the margins there were less people. The Komaygi (the English garden) was empty, the Kirov garden was quite full. And no military or police around. The only official riot police I saw was around the Prime-Ministers office on the Main Square. What a funny thing to do: why did he get scared that people will come to attack him particularly, and left the rest of the city to the people?

The Opera square was occupied by the riot police and military, and the Myasnikyan monument square, the newly built Mayor's building's square, by the populace. This was no more a rally, this was 'freeing' a part of the city.

Young and mature men were collecting metallic sticks, making them out of water tubes, or wooden sticks from the benches in the Kirov square. That was the only weaponry I could see. They say there were provocators there. Quite likely. One of my acquaintances was present when, at around 7 in the evening, two young men suggested to attack the riot police which silently came from the direction of the Prime-Minister's office towards the crowd, from behind, and stopped at around the Shahumyan Monument. These two were beaten up and later on run towards the riot police and disappeared. With these exceptions, among the people I did not see anybody who was acting provocatively. Men would think hard before breaking a tube for a stick, consult, ask permission from each other. At around the circus and at the other end, next to the wine factory, young men were stopping buses and trolleys forcibly, getting the passengers and the drivers out and bringing the buses inside the crowd's conquered territory, creating newer and newer barricades. Soon that was no more necessary, but they were continuing doing that, drunk with the sense of revolutionary action. Otherwise there were not drunk or were not high, I was watching them intently. They just did not have leadership, their leaders were spontaneous, and everybody was suggesting to do what they thought best to increase the security of the protesters. But the euphoria from the power of getting buses as tropheys was taking over, and it was clear that it was not going to stop at that point. Once you break a rule—it's like a snowball.

Except for Ter-Petrossyan, the rest of the leadership of the movement was on the podium under Myasnikyan. It took a while to bring a megaphone. And even when it was brought the construction of the open square is such that only those standing close to the monument could hear what Nikol Pashinyan, Aram Sarkissyan and others were yelling. The people around the monument were standing densely, after the first set of bus-barricades the crowd was less dense, it was really a lot of people there, in my perception much more than usually at the Opera Square, this gathering was equal to the biggest ones Levon had had so far, if not the biggest. This square is new, but it has history: it was at the place of the Wine factory that the Persian Sardar's (ruler's) old castle was, which was taken over by the Russian army and Armenian volunteers in 1828, freeing this part of Armenia of the Persian rule and thereby establishing the historical setting for Armenia to gain independence. In that castle, Griboedov's 'Trouble from Mind' was staged afterwards by the soliders and officers of the Russian garrison, which was essentially the premiere of that play. In terms of its new architecture, this square is probably the most successful achievement of the Kocharyan administration, containing a few modern buildings, among which is the Mayor's building and the Museum of Yerevan city (brought here from the run down areas around the Persian Mosque, which in turn is renovated and is functioning), and in front of them—the Moscow house, a business center symbolizing the Russian Mayor Lujkov's close business ties with Armenia, as well as the Russian-Armenian university. The revolutionary Myasnikyan and Shahumyan, as well as people's Artist Frunze Mkrtchyan, writer Hrant Matevossyan, poet Hovhannes Shiraz and others, whose big photos were watching the historical movement, looked like finally acquiring a purpose: that was the purpose of building new, fair, uncorrupt Armenian state, which was motivating the overwhelming majority of the rally participants. Komaygi, to the contrary, the Congress hotel and the French embassy looked abandoned and lost: that was because for both French Embassy and the Congress hotel the territory of Komaygi, one of the central public parks, has been violated and infringed upon, and therefore these buildings cannot claim the moral superiority similar to the Mayor's house and other parts of the square, which has been mainly built without violating the rules of Yerevan architecture, and have a right to participate in history.

While in the center of the rally people were still waiting for Levon to come over, the ouskirts of it were getting more and more ungovernable. The group of riot police who was previously kept in a bus nearby, somehow hidden from the crowd, hurriedly left in the bus with people yelling after it. Then from 6 o'clock onwards the riot police started to approach. There were clashes at around 7 next to Shahumyan (when the provocators were silenced), and at around 9 next to the Fish Shop. The first clash here was successfully won by the people, but it didn't stop, and another clash ensued, this time longer. Shooting with tracer bullets (I don't know of what make) intensified. At around 10, standing next to the Mosque on the former Lenin avenue, I could see a group of riot police shooting with tracer bullets and being shot back at, on the top of the hill (in front of St. Grigor Church) underneath which the road goes towards the airport and the American Embassy. Some of the tracer bullets would fly over our heads, high in the sky. Apparently, the riot police was shooting high in the air, but so intensively, that it was not so much scary as much as adversarial. Then they run towards us, the idle observers of the battle. We thought that they were going to crash us and run forward, but then we saw with total surprise that they fast sat in a bus and left the avenue to go apparently to the Leo street from behind. I immediately called those who were next to the Myasnikyan street and learned from them that they thought this being a provocative retreat: people who were shooting at them, their spirits taking over their minds, run after the riot police and here is when the burning of the cars started on a massive scale. It should be noted that later on the soldiers were brought in. I can't say about the age of the riot police, they were in the helmets, but the soldiers were and are young, and the rioters who were shooting and hitting them with the bottles full of gasoline were also young. Thus the fathers used their sons as cannon meat, which is quite usual in this world, in order for their own understanding of what is right and wrong to win over their adversary's.

I went home to see the press-conference of Vardan Oskanyan, the usual political mouthpiece of the incumbent government, who tried to say something close to truth about a turning point in history and about the need for peaceful and balanced approach. One of the major points of his speech, however, was about Ter-Petrossyan: he clarified that Ter-Petrossyan was not under house arrest per se, but rather that his bodyguards, his detail, being state employees, did not let him to go to the Myasnikyan Monument, because as if could not guarantee his well-being at that rally which was not sanctioned. Thus, according to Oskanyan, Ter-Petrossyan had a choice: to sign a paper that he voluntarily refuses the need in state-provided detail and to go to the rally officially unprotected, or to stay at home. This moral ultimatum at the time when the entire movement was waiting for him was, of course, a smart way by the incumbent powers to further tarnish the image of Ter-Petrossyan. And while everybody today, and he himself first of all, claims that if he was allowed to the rally, the situation would evolve differently, I don't think so. This square was too big to be governable by one person, even if the leader, and the amount of those provocators who infiltrated the crowd (which was impossible to do in big numbers in the well contained Opera square) was correspondingly uncountable. I saw myself at least two times still when it was daylight two young men, both well-groomed rather than disheveled (i.e. not having slept in the Opeare square for the last few nights, shaven, with good haircut and well-dressed), trying to do something illegal, like to break the water tubes to make sticks from them. Both times I saw them being stopped, though softly, by others, who looked more like being from among those who slept in the Opera square.

Thus while Ter-Petrossyan should bear a part of responsibility for loss of human life that night, but his coming to the square would not totally prevent that from happening, since it was scheduled to happen by the very same plan which masterminded the Opera cleansing at dawn.

My aunt, who lives at the intersection of Leo street and former Karmir Banaki, saw the entire battle, a part of which I watched from the side of the former Lenin avenue, with her own eyes: first, at around 10.30, the same time I saw the riot police run, she saw them dispersing the crowd at the other side. She also saw them using some kind of gaz, which according to some people was a very weak sort of tear gaz. I think maybe it was mixed with something else because it was just sold in the black market by those who were in charge of keeping it, as it usually happens in Armenia. Whatever. At that very point in time, or slightly later, my friend from the Myasnikyan side told me that the first attack has been countered (I think that was the attack I saw), and another good acquaintace said that they inhaled tear gaz and went to have a rest at a friend's office nearby. My aunt's predicament, however, was the worst, because the elderly lady had to watch a casualty, a human body lying on the sidewalk for several minutes and the Emergency Doctors or nobody else daring to approach the body, because of loud shooting with tracer bullets. Then, she said, the riot police standing nearby, in three meters around the corner, a group of youngsters put one or more cars on fire, broke the shop windows, and started a wild dance. This continued on even when Kocharyan declared a state of emergency and the soldiers arrived to Leo street in military trucks: they also did not intervene, until the youngsters were dancing around the fire from the cars. The body, however, was picked up at some point.

At every point of my personal interacting with the rioters, while being an outsider rather than a protagonist of the events, I could see mostly people who don't have any leadership, people who are doing things slowly, trying to think it through, people who intently measure each other and myself, trying to understand if they (we) are on the same tune, if we are together in our desire to change Armenia for better, people who put a lot of effort to stop and counter provocations, people who were trying to convince the soldiers and the riot police to disperse and join the people, rather than attacking them. Similarly, all the actions of the riot police that I witnessed, were slow, unclear, lacking unified command, contradictory and emotional, as if they were mostly left at their own devices, to attack or to wait, to retreat or to attack, to beat up the rioters or to succumb. In the eyes of the rally participants, and in the eyes of many walkers beforehand in the central streets of Yerevan, and in the eyes of those who walk today, not daring to group because of the Emergency Rule, I see one and the same intent question: who are you? Are you with us? Do you also want fair Armenia, or are you one of those who because of personal gain or relational affiliation with the clan, or just because of any other reason are with them ? Do you understand that we are one and the same nation, and that we don't want your pain, we want your happiness? We are not dividing, as you often claim, because if a part of the nation aims at a liar-state, we cannot all unite with that part merely for the sake of unity. All those who did or do actions these days on behalf of the opposition, give me an impression of people who are very busy with measuring their every act. Almost every citizen of Armenia today measures his and her every step: is not joining cowardice or moral act? Where does the fine line lie? This is a situation where cowardice becomes, in a way, sometimes wisdom, and I think it was due to that indecisiveness and cowardice from both sides, from the side of the rioters and from the side of the riot police and soldiers, from economizing on every action, that the amount of casualties is not overwhelming. Blessed be this cowardice, even if many people are weighing inside themselves, whether in order to achieve fairness more victims are justified or not, and whether the desire to avoid more victims justifies another several years of cowardice and succumbing to a life based on lies, with no freedoms and opportunities.

I saw people who were arguing that what they do is by no means against the Karabakhis per se, and people who were saying 'why do you rebel? Why do you make a distinction who is a Karabakhi and who is not? Why don't you succumb to the powers in charge for the sake of stability?'. I heard rumors about the Karabakhi riot police being the most brutal one—I don't believe that. I hear now rumors that casualties are many more than the official figure (8 or 9) and the CNN figure (54). Given that even the amount of victims of the 1988 Sumgait pogroms is still, 20 years on, unclear, and that the lack of freedom of speech is today not less than then, no wonder. However, I should say that over these years the populace in general has learned slightly better to counter the rumors, just learning the hard way that not every horrible news that is being brought by the word of mouth or the official TV is worth believing into. But until when? Where is the fine line which distinguishes an as if accepted leader who awkwardly manipulated the election and an estranged power who has no more any moral authority left to govern the nation it manipulated? How much more blood is needed to prove the point, to illustrate the reality? When will the manipulation with public opinion stop, and the old soviet trick ('we are surrounded by enemies, therefore please let me rob you and don't complain') cease to strike a familiar chord in the heart of the post-homo sovieticus, making him a helpless accomplice in crime and corruption?

I write this in English, I couldn't make up my mind in which language to write this for a while. It would be better to write this in Armenian or Russian, for my compatriots to be able to read this, but then I decided to write this in English, not in order to influence the world public opinion, I kind of don't trust it, but in order for those of my compatriots who cannot read Armenian to be able to read this account, which I try to keep as close to truth as it is given to me. I write this also for all the people of good will, who if they can influence anything, should try to do something in order to stop the escalating and accelerating spiral of violence, which despite all the brakes will take over Armenia, because of the moral, ethical and corruptional compromises that its political elites and intelligentsia have committed over the last fifty decades.

...

While the international community considered the elections a done deal based on reports by monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the local opposition demanded an annulment of the elections, citing major violations and fraud.

What followed was a call by Ter-Petrossian to hold continuous and peaceful demonstrations until the authorities conceded and held new elections. While the number of people participating in the demonstrations was not extremely large (reports from local media and observers put estimates anywhere between 20,000 to 100,000), the protests were the largest Yerevan has seen in the last 10 years.

The government's initial response was to ignore the demonstrations and continue with business as usual. This position was further encouraged as Sargsian received support from the international community in the form of election monitor reports as well as congratulatory messages from Washington and Moscow.

Sargsian also managed to win the support of local political figures by striking a deal with Arthur Baghdasarian, a former speaker of the house who had earlier broken ranks with Sargsian to run for president. He received 16 percent of the votes in February's elections. Many analysts have argued that Baghdasarian had always been Sargsian's protégé and that run attempt at the presidency was actually orchestrated by Sargsian in order to steal votes from Ter-Petrossian.

A day before riot police and internal security forces violently dispersed the demonstrators, Baghdasarian met with Sargsian and announced that he recognized him as Armenia's legitimate president and would be willing to cooperate with him to handle "domestic and external challenges" Armenia Liberty news service reported.

The local news media then focused on a statement read by Baghdasarian in which he mentioned that he had been offered and had accepted the mostly ceremonial position of secretary of Armenia’s National Security Council.

It is highly conceivable that the realignment of Baghdasarian with Sargsian gave the latter more confidence to give the orders to disperse the demonstrators the following day.

In the subsequent gatherings on Saturday afternoon, many of the demonstrators chanted "Arthur, traitor," signaling their discontent with Baghdasarian's move to join Sargsian.

Witnesses in Yerevan told ISN Security Watch by telephone that early on the morning of 1 March, internal security forces and riot police surrounded the demonstrators, who had spent the night at Freedom Square, and after giving them only a five-minute warning to leave the area, used heavy force to disperse them. Most of the demonstrators were caught by surprise, and what ensued was chaotic.

Ter-Petrossian, who had also spent the night at the square, was surrounded by police forces and escorted to his residence just outside of the city center.

Immediately after the dispersal of the demonstrators, the crowd gathered at another square near the French Embassy. According to one witness who spoke to ISN Security Watch on condition on anonymity, on Saturday morning there were close to several hundred demonstrators at the new location. However, in a matter of a couple of hours, as many as 10,000 had joined the protest.

The new venue was again surrounded by riot police. Largely because of the absence of a strong leadership calling for calm, clashes escalated between the police and the protesters. It was at this point that President Robert Kocharian announced a 20-day state of emergency in Yerevan, banning "strikes, public rallies, demonstrations, marches and other mass events," and more significantly, censoring all media reports and limiting them to "official information of state bodies."

With Ter-Petrossian was confined to his house by authorities (according to official statements he was not put under house arrest but was isolated for his own safety) there were very few opposition leaders able to calm the crowd. During most of the evening of 1 March there were violent clashes between some radical elements among the demonstrators and the police, resulting in hundreds of casualties and at least seven deaths.

Polarization
One witness in Yerevan told ISN Security Watch: "Saturday night was surreal. At one intersection one could see events unfolding with characteristics of a revolution, while a few blocks up the street people were walking their dogs, taking their dates home and eating at restaurants as if nothing was happening."

This observation illustrates the extent of popular apathy and could indicate that Armenia is not, as many observers and experts have considered, on the verge of a colorful revolution as happened in Ukraine and Georgia, where there were elements of overwhelming popular mobilization and foreign - specifically western - support. The current Armenian opposition has neither, and as such is bound to develop in ways dissimilar to these colorful revolutions.

Even before the announcement of the state of emergency and media blackout, the local media was polarized.

On the one hand, official media sources disregarded any and all reports about demonstrations, which immediately before the 1 March events had spread to the northern cities of Gyumri and Vanatzor.

On the other hand, opposition media (mostly print and online) were calling for the continuation of the demonstrations and reporting arrests and provocations by the authorities.

It was ironic that on 2 and 3 March the Armenian media spent more time covering the Russian presidential elections than they did the events in their own capital. As such, the residents of Yerevan found it necessary to rely on outside news sources to learn about what was happening in their own city.

Only one television media source, Yerkir Media - affiliated with the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) party and whose candidate Vahan Hovannisian came in a distant fourth with 6 percent of the votes in the presidential elections - offered limited coverage of the demonstrations, mostly without commentary.

The ARF is the only major political party in Armenia that has not, until now, taken sides. While admitting defeat, the ARF did not congratulate Sargsian on his win, and in the very few official announcements that the party released, its officials called for calm and blamed Ter-Petrossian for polarizing the country.

This perhaps was a direct result of the stark rivalry between Ter-Petrossian and the ARF during the former's tenure as president when he banned the ARF from operating in Armenia, claiming that the party was planning a coup d'état.

Tense calm
An interesting issue related to the makeup of the demonstrators was that according to many interviews conducted by ISN Security Watch, most of the demonstrators were not Ter-Petrossian supporters. Some of them were even staunch opponents of the former president.

However, with the absence of any other viable opposition leader, Ter-Petrossian became a de facto representative of civil society and youth movements, including a sizeable section of Armenians who in the last decade or so have become frustrated with the current government's socio-political and economic policies.

The Armenian capital has been in a state of tense calm since Sunday, and while the demonstrators are currently dispersed and internal security forces are stationed all over the capital, the opposition has vowed that after the end of state of emergency later this month, they will take to the streets once again. Meanwhile, the international community has been trying to mediate in an attempt to find a permanent solution to the crisis.

In an overall mood of apathy, the main question remains if in 20-days time Ter-Petrossian will be able to mobilize enough people to continue his demonstrations.

In the meantime, the foundation has been laid for behind-the-scenes negotiations for which both the government and Ter-Petrossian will attempt to "recruit" as many allies as possible.

With Sargsian already having secured the support of Baghdasarian ahead of his officially taking over from Kocharian on 9 April, he seems to be ahead of his political rival by calling for all sides to join his government with the promise of various posts and positions to be awarded for loyalty.

With a media blackout in place, state-controlled television showed President Kocharian visiting some of the injured policemen at the hospital with minimum comments about the situation and mostly criticism of Ter-Petrossian and his alleged role in the fomenting the unrest.

The only source of independent (although biased) news remains the various blogs maintained by individuals in Armenia and a handful of international news agencies that have limited access to properly assess the situation in the country.

Twenty days is a long time in the life of political movements, and it is very possible that the demonstrators will lose their momentum. Ironically, the authorities could have achieved the goal of dispersing the demonstrations by simply ignoring them. In situations like these, the use of force could be an indicator of government insecurity and could increase the resolve of the opposition to continue with their demands.

...

After a decade of self-imposed isolation, the former president declared his candidacy with an agenda to "clean the house" and managed to gather enough endors****ts from various opposition groups that he was viewed as the main opposition contender against Sargsian. Ter-Petrossian's potential return created much speculation both domestically and internationally about the possibility of Armenia's first president becoming its third one as well.

While Ter-Petrossian was gaining momentum and challenging the status quo, the government's response was swift and the state-owned and supported media staged a campaign against the former president by linking his return with the dire socio-economic conditions that Armenians were living under during his first tenure in power, when Armenia was fighting a war in Nagorno-Karabakh and the country was under an economic blockade from Turkey.

On election day, two diverging trends describing the election process appeared. While international monitors - mostly from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) - reported that the elections were administered in compliance with OSCE and Council of Europe standards, the local media painted another picture.

Even from the early hours of the election, news that pro-Sargsian and pro-Ter-Petrossian groups had been conducting gross violations of electoral laws such as ballot stuffing and intimidating election monitors were reported by a wide array of local media sources. At the end of the day election results showed that Sargsian had won the election by almost 53 percent of the votes, thus sparing him a run-off second stage election with his nearest rival Ter-Petrossian, who was officially declared to have won over 21 percent of the votes.

The phenomenon of conflicting reports on the election process raised the question in the minds of Armenian citizens whether Russia and the West were more interested in stability and continuity of the current regime’s policies than they were in observing that elections were free and fair.

The immediate outcome was that the Ter-Petrossian camp called for the annulment of the results and asked the people to continuously demonstrate until their demands were met.

While tens of thousands of people have responded to Ter-Petrossian's call, it seems that the election results are final.

This final sentiment was echoed by the pro-establishment newspaper Hayots Ashkharh where it announced that "the unequivocally positive assessment of the [19 February] elections by the international community settled the issue of determining Armenia's next president both for itself and for us."

Two issues remain important for the survival of the demonstrations. The first is the chance that the demonstrators have to translate their street power into a more sustained political movement. The fact that the next parliamentary elections are over three years away means that it is difficult for the opposition to try to control the legislative branch and create a de facto system of checks and balances.

In the 1998 presidential elections when Robert Kocharian won, his main challenger Karen Demirchian managed to build on the momentum that he had during the presidential elections to establish an alliance with other opposition leaders and take over the parliament and use it as an institutional base to challenge the presidency. The strategy was successful until Demirchian was assassinated during a parliament session only months after his success.

The second issue that could determine the future of the political situation in Armenia is the continued defection by pro-government deputies and government officials - including several high-ranking Defense and Foreign Ministry officials - to the Ter-Petrossian camp.

True, there were quite a few number of defectors before the elections, which could have been explained by the reports that Ter-Petrossian had high chances of being elected and hence people joined his camp based on that premise, but the continued defections during the post-election period raises the issue of whether the anti-government demonstrators still have a chance to reverse the election results.

The main question remains if Armenia is on the eve of a colorful revolution or a colorless transition of power.

While the political situation remains tense, there are no signs that the demonstrations could turn violent as the opposition has been adamant about reiterating that they will not use force to reverse the lections results.

The power of the demonstrators could be tested in the coming weeks if they continue to build momentum with more defectors joining their ranks or just withering away as people return to "business as usual" mode.

...

We applaud both the government and the opposition in Armenia for avoiding successfully any incidents of violence in the context of large public political rallies on behalf of each of the two top candidates. This peaceful exercise of the freedom of assembly, coupled with effective, non-violent, crowd management, is a notable achievement and a sign of democratic progress. We call on all sides to ensure that this peaceful situation continues.

Mr. Chairman, we need also to recognize that this election was far from perfect. Although the administration of the election procedure was mostly in line with OSCE standards, key OSCE commitments, regarding the planning and execution of democratic elections, remain unmet in Armenia as noted in the OSCE preliminary findings. We call on the Government and people of Armenia to commit themselves to address these concerns.

After Election Day, together with other international observers, United States representatives carefully reviewed the findings of observers that included our own, those from opposition parties, and from NGOs. Concerns fell broadly into the following areas:

--favorable treatment before Election Day of the government's candidate, including the employment of public officials for private campaign duties;

--instances of ballot stuffing;

--vote-buying, multiple voting and voter intimidation; and

--an unusually high turnout in some regions that in some cases might have been an indicator of irregularities.

Most recently, there were disturbing irregularities with the recount of votes in a number of polling stations as well as OSCE reports of limitations on freedom of speech.

We also are very concerned about the post-election arrests of opposition politicians, as well as reports that authorities have forcibly closed opposition offices. These kinds of actions are not consistent with democratic principles, and we urge the Government of Armenia to uphold the rule of law and international democratic standards in proceeding on these cases.

Because of such real and perceived irregularities, we remain concerned that the level of trust among the Armenian electorate in their election process remains dangerously low. We encourage the authorities in Armenia to conduct transparent, rapid investigations of all complaints as part of the process of ongoing election reform and to rebuild public trust.

We support the ongoing effort of ODIHR to catalogue the complaints it has received, and we look forward both to their next interim report on the elections and to the final report and recommendations.

The United States remains ready here and in Yerevan to work with all the parties in Armenia to address these problems.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

...

The two governments also agreed to set up a joint venture that will explore and develop Armenia's uranium reserves. More importantly, the Russians reaffirmed their strong interest in the planned construction of a new Armenian nuclear plant, which is expected to replace the existing Soviet-era facility at Metsamor by 2016. Sergei Kiriyenko, head of the state nuclear energy agency, Rosatom, said Russian companies are well placed to win a relevant tender by the authorities in Yerevan

Speaking at a joint news conference after the talks, Zubkov and Sarkisian welcomed a 65% surge in Russian Armenian trade which totaled about $700 million in 2007 and may well pass the $1 billion mark this year. Zubkov said Moscow will help expand a rail-ferry service between the Georgian Black Sea port of Poti and Russia's Port-Kavkaz, which was launched last year and mainly caters for cargos shipped to and from landlocked Armenia (Armenian Public Television, February 6).

Few observers doubt that the main purpose of Zubkov's visit, the second in less than six months, was to boost Sarkisian's electoral chances in a country where pro-Russian sentiment has traditionally run high. As an unnamed Armenian government official quoted by Moskovskii Komsomolets on February 7 explained, "The authorities are alarmed by street protests staged by the [Armenian] opposition every day. They are attended by more and more people. The visit by your prime minister will demonstrate to the electorate on whose side Russia is."

Moscow has clearly not been interested in regime change in Yerevan until now. After all, Sarkisian, who also co-chairs a Russian-Armenian inter-governmental commission on economic cooperation, has played a key role in the signing of controversial agreements that have left virtually the whole of Armenia's energy sector and other industries under Russian control in the last several years. Several Russian dailies quoted an unnamed official accompanying Zubkov as saying that a "continuity of power" is essential for the development of Russian-Armenian relations. Vyacheslav Nikonov, a prominent pro-Kremlin pundit, agreed. "Strategically, Sarkisian's nomination [for the Armenian presidency] suits Moscow, which has given him support at the top level," Nikonov wrote in a February 7 commentary for RIA-Novosti agency. "It would be appropriate to take steps that would demonstrate our readiness to render Armenia substantial economic assistance," he said.

Yet Moscow is treading more carefully that one would expect. Neither President Vladimir Putin, nor his handpicked successor, Dmitry Medvedev, have made any public statements in support of Sarkisian's election victory so far. Even Zubkov stopped short of explicitly doing that in Yerevan. "This was a very successful visit," he told reporters before flying back Moscow. "Whatever the course of the elections, everything should work out for Sarkisian. He is doing his job sincerely and wholeheartedly."

"It remained unclear to journalists whether he was referring to the work of the intergovernmental commission headed by Sarkisian or the upcoming presidential elections in Armenia," Nezavisimaya gazeta commented the next day. Nor is it clear why another top Russian official, State Duma speaker Boris Gryzlov, did not even talk to journalists during a separate trip to Yerevan a week earlier.

Sarkisian is in even greater need of Russian backing now that his election victory no longer seems a forgone conclusion. His most formidable challenger, former president Levon Ter-Petrosian, has pulled massive crowds during the ongoing election campaign and has even won over some government loyalists. Ever since his dramatic political comeback in September 2007, Ter-Petrosian has been at pains to differentiate himself from the staunchly pro-Western leaders of democratic revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine and to express his commitment to maintaining close ties with Russia. Speaking at a news conference on January 11, he emphasized the fact that Armenia had agreed to a long-term presence of Russian in troops on its soil and signed a comprehensive friendship treaty with Russia during his rule.

At the same time, Ter-Petrosian made it clear that he believes that the Russian-Armenian relationship has ceased to be one of two equal allies since his resignation in 1998, implying that his country will be less subservient to its former Soviet master if he returns to power. The Russians will also hardly like the former president's enduring belief that the best guarantee of Armenia's national security is "normal" relations with all neighboring states, rather than a military alliance with Russia or any other foreign power.

Furthermore, Ter-Petrosian reportedly (and unexpectedly) left for Moscow on February 11 and was rumored to have met Medvedev. Such a meeting, if it really took place, could have far-reaching consequences for the Armenian election results.

But as things stand now, the Kremlin is not lending the Armenian prime minister the kind of vocal support which Ukraine's Viktor Yanukovych enjoyed before and during the 2004 Orange Revolution. In the end, Yanukovych's aggressive promotion by Putin proved fruitless and further complicated Russian-Ukrainian ties.

Writing in Polit.ru ahead of Zubkov's arrival in Yerevan, Russian analyst Sergei Markedonov warned that a similar "crude interference" in the Armenian presidential race could only antagonize many Armenians angry at their rulers. "Moscow had better not succumb to the 'Ukrainian temptation' and support only the 'correct' candidate against 'incorrect,' 'orange' and other 'colored' ones," he said.