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 ARMENIA-DIASPORA RELATIONS: 20 YEARS SINCE INDEPENDENCE
YEREVAN'S 2009 MUNICIPAL ELECTION
IMPLICATIONS OF FINANCIAL CRISIS FOR ARMENIA 
ARMENIA’S 2008 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
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Armenia's Chance for a Marshall Court
Edgar Martirosyan
Los Angeles
The Constitutional Court of Armenia will convene to decide whether the Central Election Committee’s (CEC) official declaration of Serzh Sargsian as President will stand amidst charges of widespread election fraud, or will the results of the election be thrown out and new elections ordered.
Though leaving aside the substance and the result of the elections, let us discuss the potential ramifications of the Constitutional Court’s decision. That is, irrespective of who becomes President, what effect will the Constitutional Court’s decision have on the governance of the Republic of Armenia?
At least to me, it is quite clear that widespread irregularities did take place on February 19, 2008. From ballot box stuffing to beatings, news articles and clippings to video clips attest to an election process that crippled the democratic aspirations of a nation still in its infancy. More lasting than a President is the precedence such acts establish. Regardless of who becomes President, Armenians deserve to elect an Executive in accordance with their ideals in a free, fair, and dignified manner.
Today, the faith of democratic development in Armenia rests in the hands of five men (nine, to be exact, but five of whom can carry the day). If the Constitutional Court does indeed find the elections of February 19, 2008 null and void, it will have succeeded in much more than overturning a particular fraudulently conducted presidential election. It will establish a precedent giving the Court the authority to challenge the Executive, and thus will successfully take a step in the right direction in terms of developing democratic governance standards.
Armenia has lagged so far in achieving the democratic ideals to which its Constitution purports to aspire precisely because it has failed in establishing an effective balance of powers. The judiciary has for the most part been subject to the Executive’s will. It would take some stretch of the imagination to argue that the courts have adequately challenged the excessive power exercised by the executive. For once, that can be changed in a dramatic way, giving the Constitutional Court the functional legitimacy to carry out its duties promised in theory.
Quite simply, the Constitutional Court’s decision has the potential to set a legal precedent tantamount to the Marshall court; a step forward few countries in the post-soviet bloc can claim. Five men will be the judge.
A very-well written piece. Thank you.
Do we know how vulnerable (i.e., dependent on the Executive branch) the judges of the C. Court are? (I only know that the Chairman is appointed for life. How about others?) Could they be dismissed by the president and the process/hearings started over if the C. Court supports the petition to annull the elections?
Posted By: David on Feb 24, 2008 11:11PM
Does the Chair of the Court at least have a veto power? Would it be relevant in this case? Thanks.
Posted By: NM on Feb 25, 2008 10:25AM
According to the Rules, “The Constitutional Court member shall be independent and only subject to the Constitution and to the Law while administering constitutional justice.” The Law of the Republic of Armenia on the Constitutional Court (TLRACC) CH. 2, Art. 9, § 1. In fact, the TLRACC attempts to shield justices from influence by stipulating that members have “no right to seek for instructions or receive those in the course of its activities,” and that “[a]ny exerting of influence on a Member of the Court in relation to his/her activities is prohibited and shall be persecuted by Law.” TLRACC CH. 2, Art. 9, § 2 and 3. The members are irremovable, and are granted immunity during their tenure. TLRACC CH. 2, Art. 10, § 1, and Art. 11, § 1. Basically, their appointment is for the entire duration of their tenure as codified by the TLRACC. To put it another way, it seems that they are all appointed for “life,” the term life being prescribed by the applicable rules and regulations regarding tenure.
However, it is worth noting that the members can be “detained, involved as an accused or subjected to administrative liability through the judicial process except with the consent of the Constitutional Court and the body that has appointed him/her, i.e. the National Assembly and the President.” TLRACC CH. 2, Art. 11, § 2. In sum, though, most of the procedures pertaining to the discipline of Constitutional Court members revolve around criminal conduct (and hence, not pertinent for our purposes). But, for clarity’s sake, the law does not impose very strict boundaries in detaining, charging, and/or prosecuting members of the Constitutional Court for criminal conduct. Their immunities remain in tact even in the case that martial law is declared. TLRACC CH. 2, Art. 11, § 8.
The powers of the Constitutional Court member seem to be automatically revoked when: (1) he or she has reached the age of 65; (2) has died; (3) has had his/her citizenship withdrawn or has been granted a foreign citizenship; (4) submits a resignation in writing; (5) is determined by a Court of Law to be unable to work, missing or dead; (6) has been found guilty by a Court of Law; (7) has been appointed with a violation of Constitution, which was proved by a Court of Law. TLRACC CH. 3, Art. 14 § 1. Section 3 of the same Chapter, same Article, provide for more a more broad basis for removal or suspension of powers, yet the section is prescribed by section 5, which stipulates that “[i]n the cases described by Paragraph 3 of this Article the President applies to the Constitutional Court for Resolution on the termination of the power of the Constitutional Court Member appointed by the President. On the basis of Resolutions of the Constitutional Court finding grounds of termination the President can remove the Constitutional Court Member from the position with his/her decree.” TLRACC CH. 3, Art. 14 § 5. In other words, the Constitutional Court would have to issue a resolution finding grounds for termination, after which the President can do so by issuing a decree to that effect. Resolutions are issued by a two-thirds vote of the total number of Members. TLRACC CH. 6, Art. 62 § 4.
In response to the question posed, whether the members of the Court could be removed for annulling the election results, it seems that such an attempt would most likely be made under section 3 of Article 14 (Chapter 3) of TLRACC. However, as noted above, a resolution finding grounds for termination must be issued by the Constitutional Court itself. Hence, in case of a majority opinion, that would seem unlikely if the hidden agenda for removing a particular member or set of members was for their decision. While the President of the Court does not have veto power over the decisions of the Court, he is entitled to casting his vote last. TLRACC CH. 6, Art. 62 § 2.
Posted By: Edgar Martirosyan on Feb 25, 2008 03:23PM
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